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Histories of nuclear criticism: the end of the world as we knew it 
The unthinkable happened at 4.20pm on 28 October, 1988. Though lasting only 
thirty-six minutes – betrayal by European NATO allies prevented escalation into the 
global holocaust many had feared – nuclear attack transformed the United States. As 
Whitley Strieber and James Kunetka record in an extraordinary travel narrative about 
a perilous journey around the country five years later, the United States shattered. 
Jeffersonian nostalgists might dream of an American revival, returning the country to 
its pioneer roots – a ‘nation of farmers, where … the family is the centre of things’ as 
one woman remarks to them (Strieber and Kunetka: 127) – but Aztlan, the Hispanic 
Free State, is thriving within the borders of what used to be Texas, and California and 
the Western states, booming as they service an influx of Japanese industrialists, are 
agitating to cede from the Union. The dollar is unstable and Japanese yen are generally 
preferred. Elsewhere the British Relief provide welcome support, but the Old World 
can’t resist the colonial impulse to inveigle its way into government and extract the 
country’s resources. As Strieber and Kunetka’s interviews with teachers, 
administrators, economists and others show, as the statistics they cite demonstrate, 
that nuclear war was unthinkable didn’t matter in the end. It happened.  
 
Except, it didn’t. Except, one is tempted to say, such is the seductive power of the past, 
of course it didn’t. Although Strieber and Kunetka’s novel, Warday and the Journey 
Onward (1988), might be remarkable for the specificity and detail with which nuclear 
war is rendered – it is given a date and time; the resulting socio-economic trauma is 
documented in imaginary tables of statistics and transcriptions of interviews – it is 
entirely typical of texts from the first nuclear age in imagining a cataclysmic, jarring 
release to the sustained state of suspense that was the Cold War. For something so 
famously unthinkable, it is remarkable how many attempts there were to think a 
nuclear future. These fictions proliferated not only in novels of course, but also in the 
military games through which nuclear futures were fought out, in civil defence 
planning for post-war reconstruction and, not least, in the nuclear futures exploding 
in people’s dreams. They also became mundanely part of everyday life and popular 
culture – in board games like Apocalypse, for instance. 
 
From the perspective of the twenty-first century, and with the benefit of hindsight, 
such visions seem almost quaint. The mode of our remembering might even be 
nostalgic. Indeed, the past becomes attended by an aura of inevitability. We should, of 
course, resist the impulse to view it in this way. It emerges from a solipsistic view of 
the present, turning history into a series of inevitable steps toward a single, 
predetermined outcome. It renders history cosy and safe and stops us engaging with 
the lived experience of the past and the multiple potential futures encoded within it. 
 
This is particularly important for nuclear studies. Most of this article is about the 
futures of nuclear criticism, but to deal with these we must attend to the past: it is an 
historicist criticism as well as a futurist one and these two modes are intimately 
bound up with one another, for our stories about the nuclear past become stories 
about our nuclear futures. The Cold War is the first clearly defined period of the 
nuclear age and to treat its outcome as the only possible one is to underwrite the 
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fallacy both that nuclear weapons kept the peace and that, therefore, they can be 
expected so to do in the future. That they deterred certain kinds of war, slowing the 
rhythms of global conflict, might – might – be true, but as any statistician will tell you, 
one iteration of a sequence is a poor predictor of future events. As Martin Amis put it 
in ‘Thinkability,’ the introduction to his short story collection, Einstein’s Monsters 
(1987), ‘the trouble with Deterrence is that it can’t last out the necessary timespan, 
which is roughly between now and the death of the sun’ (Amis, 16-17). 
 
Hence, in its historicist mode, nuclear criticism should treat past imaginations of 
nuclear futures with seriousness and without condescension. It should do this not 
only because they might speak still to our nuclear futures, but also because the history 
of things that didn’t happen and of the cultural and social consequences of their not 
happening is an important one. This need not mean adopting an apocalyptic 
perspective. Indeed, a serious nuclear studies engages the complex range of our 
nuclear pasts and futures. In its historical mode this means, for instance, resisting the 
impulse to assume that Cold War nuclear fear was experienced universally and 
traumatically; in its futurist mode, it is to acknowledge the range of potential nuclear 
futures, some of which may indeed be apocalyptic, but in many of which nuclear 
technologies will persist more mundanely.  
 
Futures of nuclear criticism 
These issues of our nuclear pasts and futures seem particular resonant in a 
contemporary moment in which the idea of the Anthropocene is gaining critical 
currency. There is interest in the concept partly because the Anthropocene Working 
Group is currently formulating a proposal, for consideration by the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy, to formalise the Anthropocene within the geological 
time scale, but it is also because the concept of the Anthropocene speaks more broadly 
to our sense of the critical impact on the planet of a human presence. This impact is 
cross-disciplinary and extends beyond the Academy. The journal, The Anthropocene 
Review, for instance, puts research in the sciences alongside that in the humanities, 
the Nottingham Contemporary gallery has recently laid on free study sessions on the 
Anthropocene in the Midlands and Robert Macfarlane, one of Britain’s great nature 
writers, has published a major essay on the subject in The Guardian. 
 
Perhaps, surprisingly, the relevance of the Anthropocene to nuclear studies isn’t 
particularly because the radionuclides blown around the globe by nuclear weapons 
tests may be the preferred markers of the proposed new epoch (this is something 
currently being debated), though they are certainly symbolically resonant. It is 
because the questions posed by the Anthropocene speak in profound ways to those 
nuclear criticism tackles. 
 
An exceptionalist discourse has, since at least 1945, been used to narrate nuclear 
technology. Rightly or wrongly, it has been imagined as being of a different order to 
other technologies, bound up, in the stories we tell about it, with our greatest hopes 
and anxieties about how the things we make shape and define us. Technology is 
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always cultural; nuclear technology, such is its symbolic resonance, more intensively 
so. 
 
From the beginning it has been double-coded as both the greatest intellectual triumph 
and as that which is most revealing of human destructive impulses. On the day on 
which Hiroshima was levelled (an event that led very quickly to speculation about the 
potential for nuclear weapons to be civilisation-ending), President Harry Truman 
described atomic technology as ‘harnessing the basic power of the universe’ and 
ushering in a ‘new era in man’s understanding of nature’s forces.’ It is no wonder that 
the Promethean myth has been so resonant in nuclear narratives. 
 
Like the Anthropocene, nuclear technology makes us think about questions that 
address what it is to be human and how we mesh into, are shaped by and influence 
the larger ecosystems of which we are a part: 
 
 How and how quickly does our presence on the planet change it? In other 
words, what will our human legacy to the planet be? 
 What agency do we have to shape these changes? 
 More existentially, given the larger timescales with which the Anthropocene 
puts us in touch and the ways in which nuclear fictions sometimes ask us to 
imagine the end of human existence on Earth, what is the meaning, if any, of 
human life on this planet? 
 
I suggest three problematics that could form the basis for an engaged, twenty-first 
century nuclear criticism: nuclear temporalities, nuclear geographies and nuclear 
subjectivities. In each of these areas the effects of nuclear technologies and materials 
– and, perhaps as importantly, of how they have been imagined – have been to 
unsettle our sense of our human place in the world. By addressing these areas nuclear 
criticism can engage with the profoundly disruptive ways in which nuclear culture 
structures our imagination in what we might call the dawning of a long Modernity, 
measured by the slow ticking in deep time of the Anthropocene and its legacies. 
 I suggest, too, the tentative beginnings of a lexicon with which to interrogate 
these problematics. While the words and phrases suggested for this lexicon are ones 
I have found useful in thinking through nuclear culture, needless to say they may not 
suit everyone’s purposes and there is, of course, scope to supplement the list. 
 
Nuclear Temporalities 
The narration of nuclear events often disrupts the timescales within which we 
commonly understand human lives. On the one hand, nuclear moments – typically, 
the nuclear explosion or the radiation lab accident – are imagined as instantaneous 
and world-ending. This was a particular feature of the Cold War imagination in which 
nuclear disaster, usually war, was expected to be delivered out of the blue and to 
change the world entirely. Images that crop up frequently are the blinding flash of 
light and the stopped clock, conveying the sudden, jarring transition from the 
quotidian to the extraordinary. 
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On the other hand, they provoke us to think of timescales stretching beyond those 
through which we normally measure our significance: of human civilisations; of the 
species; even of the planet. These might be changes imagined to be wrought in 
cataclysmic nuclear moments (the shattered ecosystems following nuclear war, for 
instance) or they might result from the slower, more insidious effects of the ‘legacy 
waste’ we bequeath to the planet. Such longer timescales might be experienced in the 
contemporary moment, as in Bobbi Ann Mason’s novel of nuclear health scares at a 
uranium reprocessing plant, An Atomic Romance (2006); be imagined in the longer 
environmental legacies of a human presence, like those that appear in Ursula Le 
Guin’s extraordinary Always Coming Home (1985); or be imagined in the longer 
futures explored in Michael Madsen’s documentary film, Into Eternity (2010), about 
the Onkalo repository for spent nuclear fuel, in which he asks what it means to build 
an architecture to store waste for a hundred thousand years (what architecture has 
ever lasted that long? how would we communicate the dangers it houses to future 
generations? what, even, would it mean to be human in five thousand, ten thousand 
or a hundred thousand years?). 
 
Oscillating between the sudden traumas of nuclear moments and the vertigo-inducing 
chasms of geological time, nuclear narratives wrench us from the arcs of ordinary 
human lifetimes through which we normally understand reality. They shake our 
sense of our significance. 
 
Toward a lexicon for nuclear criticism: 
 Anthropocene – the idea (currently under investigation) that human presence 
is so significantly changing the planet that it should name the current 
geological epoch. Radionuclides from nuclear weapons testing might provide 
markers for the Anthropocene, but perhaps more significant for nuclear 
criticism is that both the Anthropocene and nuclear culture may challenge us 
to think of the place of humans within deep time. 
 archive (Derrida 1984) – the written and other records in which what it means 
to be human is encoded, the destruction of which is a more profound 
conceptual threat to human being than deaths of individual humans. 
 slow violence (Nixon 2011) – the gradual processes of environmental violence, 
taking place across timescales we struggle to encode in narrative and 
impacting unevenly on communities around the planet. The most obvious 
nuclear contexts for slow violence are waste and fallout. 
 states of suspense (Cordle 2008) – the experience of living in extended 
anticipation of nuclear calamity, most obviously a psychological phenomenon 
during the Cold War but persisting, rightly or wrongly, in continuing 
consciousness of living in anticipation of significant nuclear moments. 
 
Nuclear Geographies1 
Just as nuclear temporalities disrupt our sense of time, nuclear geographies challenge 
how we experience place and space. This might be, as it was for the Cold War 
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imagination and as I have discussed elsewhere, how symbolically significant places – 
the home; the city; the planet – are conceived as potentially nuclear, transformed by 
blast, heat or radiation. More profoundly, though, it is the experience or imagination 
of nuclear effects transgressing boundaries separating one place from another. This 
could be the penetration of radiation through materials that appear solid to the eye, 
the dissemination of radioactive fallout throughout and between ecosystems by 
climatic and other processes, or simply the suspicion that something like this is taking 
place. In Maggie Gee’s novel, Grace (1988), for instance, Grace’s sense of place is 
transformed when she listens to news reports from Chernobyl. Suddenly, her cosy 
home in Britain ‘becomes’ nuclear, traversed, in her mind at least, by contaminants 
travelling vectors between the domestic and the industrial: ‘Was it really there then, 
the radiation, that nervous, whispering spring? Was it in the ordinary leaves and the 
ordinary milk at breakfast?’ (Gee: 2). For all that this emerges from the exceptional 
circumstances of the Chernobyl disaster, it is a revelation of the nuclear everyday, an 
understanding of the ubiquity in ‘ordinary’ environments, objects and foodstuffs of a 
nuclear presence. 
 
In particular, nuclear geographies alert us to the scaling by which local and global 
interconnect, potentially tying those separated by boundaries otherwise imagined as 
absolute, into a common fate. To this extent nuclear geographies are illustrative of the 
power of the ecological imagination to help us understand the interconnection of 
human, industrial and natural worlds. 
 
Toward a lexicon for nuclear criticism: 
 dead city, the (Vanderbilt 2002) – one of a number of symbolically significant 
nuclear places, in this instance signalling the haunting of urban experience 
after the 1945 atomic attacks on Japan when other cities became imagined as 
potential ‘Hiroshimas.’ 
 nuclear sublime (Hales 1991) – though specifically rooted, in Hales’s analysis, 
in the US experience of bomb testing, the nuclear sublime provides a more 
generally useful concept for conceptualising the relations between 
technological and natural sublimes, and a tool for thinking how nuclear events 
challenge and exceed the imagination and may be domesticated into 
narratives that make them ‘safe.’ 
 toxic discourse (Buell 1998) – narrative that describes the interpenetration of 
human and ‘natural’ environments and chart how we understand ourselves 
within them. 
 
Nuclear Subjectivities 
As with nuclear geographies, a key motif in our understanding of nuclear 
subjectivities – of the ways in which we imagine ourselves as nuclear – is the 
transgression of boundaries, in this case those we imagine separating us from the 
world through which we move. It is a trauma of discreteness: a rupturing of the 
psychological illusion by which we think of ourselves as self-contained units, rather 
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than as ecologies in permanent exchange with the ecosystems through which we pass 
and that pass through us. 
 
Most frequently this is apparent in narratives that deal with real or imagined 
encounters with radiation. In ‘The Aftermath,’ a chapter added for the fortieth 
anniversary edition of John Hersey’s Hiroshima (1946; 1985), it becomes clear not 
only how the bodies of many hibakusha, ‘explosion-affected persons’ (Hersey: 120), 
were shaped by radioactive legacies, but also how their personal, social and working 
lives were forged by changed perceptions of them following their encounter with the 
atomic bomb. 
 
These subjectivities imply, then, both nuclear physiologies (as, for instance, when 
strontium-90, a by-product of weapons testing, is found in children’s milk teeth) and 
nuclear psychologies (how we imagine ourselves to be different because of possible 
encounters with nuclear materials or events). In her discussion of the atomic 
American West in Savage Dreams (1994), Rebecca Solnit describes visiting a peace 
camp to participate in a trespass at a nuclear weapons testing site. She ‘remembered’, 
she said, ‘to be afraid of the dust, the dust that might be radioactive’ (Solnit: 4). The 
formulation is important here: fear is meant to be instinctive, an immediate 
physiological response to physical threat. Instead, it becomes, such is the disconnect 
induced when we are threatened by dangers our senses are unable to detect, a 
conscious act, a forcing of instinct. 
 
Toward a lexicon for nuclear criticism: 
 nuclear uncanny (Masco 2005) – the eerie shimmering of everyday experience 
when we become conscious of nuclear contexts (as, for instance, when 
potential radioactive contamination makes us distrust our senses’ capacity to 
inform us about the state of our bodies and of the environment). 
 nuclearity (Hogg 2012) – the mobile and context-dependent assumptions 
people make about nuclear dangers. 
 politics of vulnerability (Cordle 2012) – the appropriation of vulnerability to 
nuclear events and effects (and, more broadly, the nuclear state) for the 
purposes of political action, frequently in ways that oppose the logics of 
violence by which power operates. Drawing attention to one’s fragility in the 
face of nuclear risk provides a means of forging a common identity across lines 
of demarcation (political boundaries; physical separation) that might 
otherwise leave people separated one from another. 
 transmutation (Weart 1988) – the logic underpinning nuclear imagery, 
describing the power of nuclear technology, materials and events to unsettle 
our sense of fixed, unchanging categories. 
 
Conclusion: mapping nuclear culture 
Attending to these problematics allows us to engage with the ways in which our world 
is mundanely and comprehensively nuclear – how it doesn’t only ‘become’ nuclear in 
exceptional circumstances. It provides the outline of a map on which to chart the 
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cultural ramifications of what Joseph Masco has called the ‘plutonium economy’ 
(Masco: 38) manifested (though the word suggests a visibility perhaps inappropriate 
to the disguise and secrecy that often accompany nuclear phenomena) in mining, 
industrial infrastructure, financial speculation and investment, nuclear energy 
production, weapons production and deployment, waste management and 
environmental containment and contamination. 
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[Note:] 
1 I am indebted to a former colleague, James Holden, who used this term when we 
discussed the anxious nuclear spaces of the American Southwest in teaching Leslie 
Marmon Silko’s Ceremony (1977). 
                                                        
